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Enacted in 2001, the New South Wales Carers’ Responsibilities Act (“CRA”) prohibits discrimination against 
employees with caregiver responsibilities and provides access to reasonable ﬂexible work arrangements. Under 
this law, employees have the right to request accommodations for their carer responsibilities, and employers 
have an afﬁrmative obligation to consider and grant reasonable accommodations that do not impose an unjus-
tiﬁable hardship. The afﬁrmative accommodation requirement extends to requests for ﬂexible working hours, 
working from home (telecommuting), part-time work, and job-share arrangements. 
“[P]rimarily targeted at reforming working time arrangements and working conditions through ﬂexible work 
practices,”1 the CRA reﬂects the government’s effort to help employees achieve a better balance between work 
and family life.2 The initial interest in this type of legislative reform came from groups seeking to address the 
disparity between women’s and men’s participation in the workforce.3 “More recently, however, the [work/
family] agenda has broadened to include men and a wider range of caring responsibilities as a result of atten-
tion to our aging population, the increased participation of older workers in the labor market (particularly 
women), the changing pattern of work hours, and men’s changing expectations about their active participa-
tion in family life.”4 A diverse coalition of government and non-government groups representing these broader 
interests spurred the development and passage of various carer responsibilities laws, including the CRA, that 
entitle employees to reasonable ﬂexible work arrangements.
Although laws protecting carers exist throughout Australia, the CRA is widely considered to be the model 
caregiver law.5 Section I of this memo reviews the substantive requirements of the CRA. Section II outlines 
the procedure for its enforcement through the New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board and Administra-
tive Decisions Tribunal. Section III analyzes how the Tribunal has interpreted and applied the CRA through the 
handful of decisions published since enactment of the CRA in 2001.
I. Statutory Framework of the CRA
In 2001, the New South Wales Parliament passed the CRA, thereby amending the Anti-Discrimination Act of 
1977 to prohibit discrimination in work based on a person’s responsibility to care for a child or immediate 
family member, which is deﬁned to include a range of family relationships as explained in Section A, below. 
Adopting a disability model of discrimination6 like that contained in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
the CRA prohibits discrimination and obligates employers to provide reasonable accommodations to employees 
with carer responsibilities absent unjustiﬁable hardship. However, unlike the ADA, which expressly incorporates 
the phrase “reasonable accommodation” in its deﬁnition of discrimination,7 the CRA does not contain the term 
“accommodation.” Instead, Parliament created the obligation to accommodate by deﬁning discrimination to 
include direct and indirect forms of discrimination against persons with carer responsibilities, as described in 
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Section B, below. It then excused employers from providing accommodations that impose an “unjustiﬁable 
hardship” as described in Section C, below. 
A. Meaning of Responsibilities as a Carer 
The CRA broadly deﬁnes the relationships that qualify an employee as someone with responsibilities as a carer. 
In doing so, the legislature sought to include the maximum number of relationships which might reasonably 
give rise to carer responsibilities.8 
A person qualiﬁes as having responsibilities as a carer if he/she is responsible “to care for or support” any of 
the following persons in need of care or support:
• Children (biological, step, adoptive, foster, or others in a similar legal relationship, be they the 
employee’s own children or grandchildren or those of their current or a former spouse or de facto 
spouse) 9; 
• Parents and grandparents (the employee’s own biological or step parents and grandparents, as well 
as those of the employee’s spouse or former spouse);
• Siblings (biological, half, step, adoptive or foster); and 
• Spouse (including current or former spouse, or those who are in a de facto spousal relationship, 
regardless of sex, as determined by an examination of the relationship in context).10 
Responsibilities as a carer can include current, perceived, or future care or support.11 Thus, a person qualiﬁes as 
having responsibilities as a carer if he/she has, is thought to have, had, or will have responsibilities to care or 
support for a child or immediate family member. 
While Parliament debated the qualifying carer relationships covered by the CRA, the terms “care for or support” 
received little comment and were not deﬁned. 12 The scope of caring responsibilities – i.e., what constitutes 
responsibilities and care or support – has been left to interpretation by the administrative agencies charged 
with enforcement of the CRA as explored further in Section III below.
B. Meaning of Discrimination Based on Carer Responsibilities 
Discrimination may be either less favorable treatment (disparate treatment), or required compliance with a 
work requirement or condition with which an employee cannot or does not comply because of her responsibili-
ties as a carer (disparate impact). The CRA provides the following general deﬁnition of direct and indirect dis-
crimination: 
49T  What constitutes discrimination on the ground of a person’s responsibilities as a carer
(1) A person ( “the perpetrator”) discriminates [based on carer responsibilities if] the perpetrator: 
(a) treats the aggrieved person less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in 
circumstances which are not materially different, the perpetrator treats or would treat a 
person who does not have those responsibilities, or 
(b) requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition with which a 
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substantially higher proportion of persons who do not have such responsibilities comply 
or are able to comply, being a requirement that is not reasonable having regard to the 
circumstances of the case and with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to 
comply.
Direct discrimination, captured in 49T(1)(a), prohibits intentional discrimination against persons with caregiver 
responsibilities. Under this provision, for example, an employer could not refuse to hire an applicant with chil-
dren based on a belief that workers with childcare responsibilities work shorter hours, take more time off from 
work, and are less willing to travel. 
Indirect discrimination, captured in 49T(1)(b), reaches facially neutral work requirements or practices – e.g., a 
requirement that all employees attend 8:00 a.m. meetings, work full-time, work from the same ofﬁce as their 
supervisor, or attend team strategy dinners. These types of requirements are unlawful if they prove more dif-
ﬁcult for persons with carer responsibilities and are “not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the 
case.” For many employees, the primary issue is the ability to balance family responsibilities with work hours 
and schedules and the critical question then becomes whether a particular facially neutral requirement is rea-
sonable under the circumstances.13 
As discussed in Section III, the Tribunal has determined whether mandatory compliance with a particular work 
requirement is reasonable based, in part, on the employer’s efforts and ability to accommodate the employee 
by providing ﬂexible work arrangements and by balancing the beneﬁts and costs of any accommodations. In 
practice, then, the disparate impact provision imposes an afﬁrmative obligation on employers to consider and 
make accommodations for employees with carer responsibilities. 
C. Unlawful Discrimination Against Applicants and Employees and the “Unjustiﬁable Hardship” Defense 
With regard to employees and applicants,14 the CRA prohibits discrimination in hiring practices, terms of 
employment, training and opportunities for advancement, termination, or in any other way.15 
While the CRA applies to most employers, it does not apply to – 
• employment in a private household; or
• employers with 5 or fewer employees.16
The law recognizes that it is not unlawful to refuse to hire or to ﬁre a person with carer responsibilities where 
the employee is unable to perform the “inherent requirements” of the job or who, in order to perform the 
inherent requirements, would require arrangements that would impose an “unjustiﬁable hardship” on the 
employer.17 
“Unjustiﬁable hardship” is deﬁned in the CRA as follows: 
49U  What constitutes unjustiﬁable hardship
In determining what constitutes unjustiﬁable hardship for the purposes of this [legislation], all 
relevant circumstances of the particular case are to be taken into account, including: 
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(a) the nature of the beneﬁt or detriment likely to accrue to or be suffered by any persons 
concerned, and 
(b) the effect of the relevant responsibilities as a carer of a person concerned, and 
(c) the ﬁnancial circumstances of and the estimated amount of expenditure required to be 
made by the person claiming unjustiﬁable hardship.
“Unjustiﬁable hardship” is therefore determined by balancing the beneﬁts and harms to the employer, 
employee, and the recipient of the employee’s care.18 
These factors overlap signiﬁcantly with factors that the Tribunal considers in determining whether a work 
requirement is reasonable under the circumstances, and the Tribunal has resolved cases based on whether a 
requirement is reasonable or not without ever reaching the question of “unjustiﬁable hardship.” It is possible 
that “unjustiﬁable hardship” may prove relevant where an employer takes the position that a challenged work 
requirement (e.g., a 9:00 starting time or on-site supervision of staff) is an “inherent requirement” of the job 
and not capable of alteration without imposing an “unjustiﬁable hardship.” In any event, the Tribunal has yet 
to address the utility and standard for “unjustiﬁable hardship” under the CRA. 
II. Enforcement by the Anti-Discrimination Board and Administrative Decisions Tribunal
The New South Wales Anti-Discrimination Board (“ADB”) administers the Anti-Discrimination Act of 1977, 
including the CRA. As described below, the ADB handles complaints of discrimination and provides guidance, 
education, training, and advice regarding legal rights and responsibilities. Following investigation and efforts at 
conciliation, the ADB may refer an unresolved complaint to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (Tribunal or 
ADT) for further consideration and resolution.
A. The Anti-Discrimination Board 
Established in the Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977 and located in the ofﬁce of the Attorney General, 19 the ADB 
is an administrative body that provides guidance and handles complaints of discrimination under the Anti-
Discrimination Act.20 The ADB website contains the following examples of and guidance regarding reasonable 
accommodations for carers under the CRA:21 
Carers’ responsibilities discrimination — Your rights
***
What are my rights in relation to getting work?
***
For example, depending on the job, the employer may be able to make any of the following sorts 
of arrangements without it causing them unjustiﬁable hardship: 
• allow you to work from home some or all days — this may mean that they also need to pay 
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for and provide you with the equipment and facilities to do this (for example, a computer 
and modem, payment for work phone calls); 
• change your start or ﬁnish times, roster arrangements, or break times; 
• allowing you to work your hours over fewer days; 
• allowing you to work part-time instead of full-time, or to job-share with someone else; or 
• being ﬂexible with the amount of unpaid or paid leave you can take and when you can take 
it.
As long as you are the best person for the job, it is really up to you and your future employer what 
you negotiate. There are no set rules. The only rule is that as long as there is some way of you 
getting the job done properly, the employer must consider whatever arrangements are necessary 
— unless it would cause them unjustiﬁable hardship to do this. 
Through general advice like this and by answering speciﬁc inquiries, the ADB seeks to prevent discrimination by 
providing information, training, and advice regarding legal rights and responsibilities under the CRA. The ADB 
also accepts complaints of discrimination and is empowered under the Anti-Discrimination Act to – 
• receive complaints and determine whether they are covered by law; 
• investigate complaints and dismiss or conciliate as appropriate; and 
• refer cases not conciliated by the ADB to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT or Tribunal).22 
The Board may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim covered by the Anti-Discrimination Act, or 
where the Board feels that the claim itself is frivolous or unfounded.23 The Board also has the right to order and 
attempt conciliation between the parties to a complaint. While the Board may negotiate settlement through 
agreement of the parties, it lacks authority to impose settlement or order a remedy if the parties fail to reach 
agreement.24 
In deciding whether to dismiss or conciliate a complaint, the Board may require the complainant and the 
respondent to produce documents and be interviewed by the President or staff of the Board. In some limited 
instances the dismissal of a complaint may be appealed by petition to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal.25 
Complaints that are not dismissed or conciliated successfully may be referred to the Tribunal. A ﬂow chart set-
ting out the ADB complaint process is included as Appendix I.
Many aspects of the complaint process before the ADB are similar to administrative proceedings before the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in the United States. However, unlike EEOC proceedings where 
parties often are represented by counsel, parties may not be represented in proceedings before the ADB 
without special permission of the President.26 
Since its enactment, the number of inquires regarding legal rights under the CRA and the number of com-
plaints that have been ﬁled with the ADB alleging discrimination based on carer responsibilities have remained 
relatively constant, and constitute a small percentage of the total calls and complaints received by the ADB. 
Annual reports from 2001 through 2005 indicate that the number of inquiries and complaints regarding carer 
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responsibilities have remained at around 5% of the total calls and complaints:
2001-2002: 871 of 15,880 inquiries (5%) and 67 of 1,625 complaints (4%)27
2002-2003: 765 of 13,593 inquiries (6%) and 88 of 1,659 complaints (5%)28
2003-2004: 535 of 9,426 inquiries (6%) and 43 of 944 complaints (5%)29
2004-2005: 39 of 1,012 inquiries (4%) and 39 of 1,012 complaints (4%)30 
 As these reports show, complaints under the CRA remain relatively infrequent, with the overwhelming majority 
being resolved through conciliation or dismissal and without further referral to the Administrative Decisions 
Tribunal.31 
B. The Administrative Decisions Tribunal
The Administrative Decisions Tribunal (ADT or Tribunal) is an independent judicial body with the power to 
review and enforce various administrative actions of New South Wales.32 The Equal Opportunity Division of the 
Tribunal has the power to – 
• review complaints referred to it by the President of the ADB;33 
• register a written conciliation agreement arrived at through an ADB conciliation as an order of the 
Tribunal, granting it the same legal force as a judgment of the Tribunal; and 
• to review, in certain instances, a decision of the ADB President to terminate or dismiss a complaint.34
“[T]he referral of a complaint to the Tribunal is taken to be an application for an original decision,”35 meaning 
that the Tribunal has the power to act as the primary decision-maker, or, put another way, is the ﬁrst ﬁnder of 
fact with regard to the complaint.36 A party may be represented by counsel before the Tribunal only at the dis-
cretion of the Tribunal. 37 
The Tribunal hears the case as a trial court and may dismiss the complaint (at any stage of proceedings) or sus-
tain it and may order:
• Compensation up to a maximum of (AU) $40,000 for loss or damage suffered;
• The person responsible for the discrimination, harassment or viliﬁcation not to continue or repeat the 
action;
• The person or company responsible to take certain actions, such as reinstating a person to their job if 
they have been dismissed;
• The person or company to publish an apology or a retraction; 
• The discriminatory terms in a contract or agreement voided or altered; 
• The person or company responsible to publish an apology or to implement a program to stop future 
discrimination.38
These are the only remedies available through the Tribunal; and each party bears its own costs.39 While the 
forms of relief from the Tribunal are limited by law, the parties remain free to agree to additional or different 
relief through the Board’s conciliation process where the remedies are developed by and at the discretion of 
the parties and constitute a private agreement between them.
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III. Carers’ Responsibilities Legislation in Practice
The ADT has published ﬁve decisions resolving complaints under the CRA since its passage in 2001. 40 Through 
these decisions, the Tribunal has interpreted key terms left undeﬁned in the CRA, including what constitutes 
“responsibilities for care or support” and, in cases of indirect discrimination, how to determine whether a work 
requirement is “not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case.” 
In deﬁning these terms and setting out the elements of a complaint’s prima facie case, the Tribunal has ﬁrmly 
placed the burden of proof on employees to establish all elements of discrimination, including the unrea-
sonableness of a neutral work requirement. In assessing whether a work requirement is reasonable, however, 
the Tribunal has required employers to prove good faith efforts to explore ﬂexible work arrangements for 
employees with carer responsibilities, and also has balanced the relative beneﬁts and costs of the allegedly dis-
criminatory work requirement and proposed accommodations. 
A. The Meaning of “Responsibilities to Care for or Support” 
The ﬁrst case to come before the Tribunal, Gardiner v. NSW WorkCover Authority, required the Tribunal to inter-
pret the meaning of “‘responsibilities to care for or support’ another person.”41 Complainant Gardiner alleged 
indirect discrimination based on her employer’s requirement that she relocate to its Head Ofﬁce in another city 
further from her home. Gardiner alleged that she was unable to comply with this work requirement because 
the additional 3-4 hours she would spend traveling to and from work each day signiﬁcantly reduced the 
amount of time she could spend with her children. 
Her employer, WorkCover, responded that “responsibilities to care for or support” means that a person must 
be obligated to perform speciﬁc tasks “such as picking up children at certain times” and that the term “must 
equate to some obligation or speciﬁc duty.”42 Because Gardiner did not allege responsibility for any speciﬁc 
caregiver duties, she failed to show that she had carer responsibilities within the meaning of the Act. 
Noting that Section 49S of the CRA “deﬁnes the relationship which must exist between the aggrieved person 
and the person who is being cared for, but does not deﬁne what is meant by ‘the person’s responsibilities to 
care for or support’ another person,” the Tribunal interpreted the phrase broadly in light of the remedial nature 
of the CRA.43 “There is no basis, either in the [Anti-Discrimination Act] itself, or in any external materials, for 
conﬁning the responsibilities to care for or support another person to particular categories of care or support 
such as dropping off, picking up or attending to a person who is sick.”44 The Tribunal agreed that Complainant 
had qualifying carer responsibilities because of her responsibility for the “day-to-day care” of her two children, 
which required her to meet their “physical, emotional and psychological needs,” which varied day-to-day.45 
By interpreting responsibilities broadly, the Tribunal relieved complainants of the burden of proving responsi-
bility for a particular task in order to receive protection and accommodation under the CRA.46 In practice, this 
reduces the employee’s burden of proving a qualifying carer relationship and showing that the person being 
cared for is “in need of care or support,” a question addressed by the Tribunal in Spencer v. Greater Murray Area 
Health Service. 
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In Spencer, the complainant alleged indirect discrimination based on her carer responsibilities after her 
employer required her to return to a ﬁve-day workweek. Her employer previously had allowed Spencer to com-
press her forty-hour workweek into four days so that she could care for her aging parents and sister, who was 
recovering from a stroke. 47 Following her transfer to a different position, the employer required her to return to 
a ﬁve-day workweek so that she would be present to supervise her staff every day.48 The employer responded 
that, among other things, Spencer was not entitled to protection as a carer because her sister and parents were 
no longer in need of care or support: Spencer’s sister had recovered to the point that she returned to work full-
time and her parents were able to perform critical tasks (shopping, cooking, driving to the doctor) for them-
selves.49 
While agreeing that Spencer “overstated the extent to which her family were in need of her care,” the Tribunal 
still found that Spencer qualiﬁed as a person with carer responsibilities: 
“Ms. Spencer need not establish that her parents and sister could not survive or function without her care or 
support. The hurdle placed by [Section] 49S (1) is not set that high. It is enough that she establish that her par-
ents and/or sister were in need of care or support.”50
Even though her parents could perform general household tasks, the fact that doing so was increasingly dif-
ﬁcult as they aged was sufﬁcient. “While theoretically [Spencer’s parents] may have been able to ‘get by’ 
without their daughter’s support, their quality of life would have been signiﬁcantly compromised had they been 
forced to do so,” making them “persons in need of ‘care and support’ “.51 Similarly, while Spencer’s sister had 
recovered signiﬁcantly, her reliance on Spencer for emotional support and “assistance in the more demanding 
activities of everyday living” qualiﬁed her as a person in need of care or support.52
Through Gardiner and Spencer, the Tribunal has interpreted the scope of protection under the CRA broadly, 
including any person with a qualifying relationship (e.g., parent-child, sister-brother, spouse/partner – spouse/
partner) who provides emotional, physical, or psychological care as needed by the other person in that relation-
ship. 
B. Indirect Discrimination: The Prima Facie Case and Determining Whether A Work Requirement  
 is Reasonable Under the Circumstances. 
Through its published decisions, the Tribunal has set out the elements of prima facie case for indirect discrimi-
nation and placed the burden of proving each element squarely on the complainant.53 The CRA deﬁnes indirect 
discrimination as -- 
 “requir[ing] the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition with which a 
substantially higher proportion of persons who do not have such responsibilities comply or are able to 
comply, being a requirement that is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case and 
with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply.”54 
The Tribunal has translated this into the following elements of a prima facie case, thus requiring complainants 
to prove 
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1) responsibilities as a carer;55
2) the existence of a mandatory work requirement;
3) inability to comply with the mandatory requirement;
4) the ability of a substantial proportion of persons without carer responsibilities to comply with that 
work requirement; and
5) that the requirement is not reasonable, considering all circumstances of the case.56
While employers may challenge the plaintiff’s proof at each stage of the prima facie case,57 and a failure to 
prove any element will result in dismissal of the complaint,58 the primary issue often becomes whether a work 
requirement is reasonable under the circumstances.
In considering this ﬁnal element of the complainant’s prima facie case, the Tribunal has found that, to be “rea-
sonable,” a work requirement must fall somewhere between mere convenience and absolute necessity to the 
proper conduct of a business: “A requirement or condition is not to be regarded as ‘reasonable’ merely because 
it is convenient . . . On the other hand, it [goes] too far to say that a requirement or condition is reasonable 
only where it is shown to be necessary or essential for the proper conduct of the respondent’s business or 
affairs.”59 In determining whether a requirement falls in the acceptable mid-range on this spectrum, the Tri-
bunal has balanced the employer’s need for the requirement against its discriminatory effect by considering: 
• the reasons for the requirement, including business beneﬁt and costs incurred if the requirement is 
removed or adapted; 
• whether the requirement is “appropriate and adapted” to meet its purpose (e.g., is a ﬁve-day 
workweek for supervisors appropriate and adapted to adequate supervision of staff); and 
• whether less discriminatory options exist, “including any accommodation of the needs of the 
aggrieved person and the possibility of alternative action which would achieve the object of the 
condition and be less discriminatory.”60
The ﬁnal factor forces employees and employers to consider and discuss possible ﬂexible work arrangements 
and places an afﬁrmative obligation on employers to make reasonable accommodation efforts. Thus, and 
despite its inclusion as part of the complainant’s prima facie case, it is the employer’s effort to accommodate 
employees’ carer responsibilities that has proved critical in determining whether a requirement is reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
In Gardiner, for example, the complaint was dismissed where the employer had engaged in “considerable efforts 
to accommodate” the complainant’s carer responsibilities.61 After requiring Gardiner to relocate to its Head 
Ofﬁce, her employer offered to: (1) help move her family closer to the Head Ofﬁce; (2) help her ﬁnd another 
job; (3) change her core hours to allow a later start time; (4) set later start times for meetings that Gardiner 
needed to attend; (5) coordinate meetings with her attendance at various ofﬁces; and (6) limit the number 
of days spent in the Head Ofﬁce to 5 days every 2 weeks.62 While agreeing that WorkCover made “a serious 
attempt” to accommodate her carer responsibilities,63 Gardiner complained that these alternatives still resulted 
in a signiﬁcant reduction in the time that she could spend caring for her children.64
10
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Balancing this detriment to Gardiner and her children against the beneﬁt obtained by WorkCover in having its 
managers at the Head Ofﬁce on “a regular, albeit ﬂexible basis each week” in order to coordinate work between 
managers and their staff, the Tribunal found WorkCover’s relocation requirement reasonable under the circum-
stances.65 
In contrast to WorkCover’s considerable efforts, the employers in Reddy and Tleyji failed to demonstrate rea-
sonable efforts to accommodate their employees with carer responsibilities.66 In Reddy, the complainant 
requested a part-time schedule following her return from maternity leave. Reddy sought to work three days 
a week from 7:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. rather than returning to her previous Monday to Friday, 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 
p.m. schedule.67 To handle any emergencies that might come up on her days off, Reddy also offered to be 
available by phone to handle urgent matters.68 Reddy’s employer rejected her request, citing a need to have 
managers at work “all the time.”69 In ruling that this full-time work requirement was not reasonable under 
the circumstances, the Tribunal noted that the employer did not consider “a job-sharing arrangement or other 
arrangement” and did not discuss possible variations of her proposal with her.70 While the employer listed the 
difﬁculties and costs of allowing Reddy to work part-time, it failed to consider the cost savings of accepting 
her proposal, including the resulting reduction in Reddy’s salary, and the costs spent in rejecting her proposal, 
including the high cost of replacing her.71 “Not only did the company apparently fail to consider it own best 
interests, even less consideration appears to have been given to the adverse effects on Mrs. Reddy by requiring 
her to work full-time.”72 As a result, the Tribunal found that the full-time work requirement was not reasonable 
under the circumstances.
In Tleyji, the employer similarly rejected the complainant’s request to work part-time without considering a 
possible job-share with other part-time employees or discussing the possibility of additional hours with the 
complainant.73 The employer offered Tleyji a different part-time position at another ofﬁce but that job change 
would have resulted in less money and a longer commute.74 In ﬁnding the full-time work requirement unrea-
sonable, the Tribunal faulted the employer for not “trialling Ms. Tleyji’s proposal to test if, as feared, business 
might be compromised if the ofﬁce was left with only one full timer” or structuring another arrangement (job-
share or temporary reassignment to another position) to accommodate her responsibilities as carer.75 “It is not 
necessary for the Tribunal to satisfy itself that no stone had been left unturned by a respondent in their evalu-
ation of alternatives. Reasonable efforts however need to be shown.”76
These cases demonstrate that, although the CRA does not expressly require an interactive process between 
employers and their employees with carer responsibilities, a key factor in the reasonableness analysis is the 
willingness of the employer to be thoughtful, ﬂexible, and innovative in negotiations with the employee. By 
reprimanding employers who reject employee proposals “out of hand”77 and fail to try employee proposals 
before dismissing them,78 the Tribunal has made it clear that employers cannot rely on past practice or tradi-
tional notions of how work gets done. Moreover, employer assertions regarding the necessity of work require-
ments like full-time employment, daily presence at a work site, or inﬂexible working hours will be tested and 
rejected if not adequately supported by the evidence.
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Conclusion
The New South Wales Carers’ Responsibilities Act increases access to and usage of ﬂexible work arrangements 
for employees with carer responsibilities. The strength of the afﬁrmative accommodation obligation, as inter-
preted thus far by the Tribunal, provides employees with a strong “right to request” and receive reasonable 
ﬂexible work arrangements. By forcing employers and employees to consider and discuss different ways of 
working and by pushing employers to be ﬂexible, innovative, and creative in implementing ﬂexible work prac-
tices, the CRA has the potential to achieve its broader goal of reforming traditional work practices. 
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Appendix I: Anti-Discrimination Board Complaint Process79
 HOW WE HANDLE COMPLAINTS
The Board’s President 
receives a written complaint
The complaint is obviously not covered 
by the law
The complaint appears to 
be covered by the law
The complaint is allocated to one of the 
Board’s complaint handlers
The complaint handler investigates the 
complaint by getting information from 
the person/organisation/group making 
the complaint (the complainant) and 
the person/organisation/group against 
whom they are alleging discrimination 
(the respondent)
We write a letter to the person 
making the complaint explaining this 
and indicating who else (if anyone) 
might be able to help
The complaint is not conciliated
The complaint may be referred to the 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal
The Tribunal hears arguments 
and evidence and makes a judicial 
decision that is legally binding
The complaint is conciliated
The complaint handler tries to conciliate 
the complaint by helping the people 
involved to find a private settlement 
they can agree on.  This might involve 
calling those involved to one or more 
conciliation conferences
The complaint appears to involve 
discrimination that is against the law
The complaint does not 
appear to involve unlawful 
discrimination
The President writes to the  complainant 
explaining this.  The complainant may 
then have the right to apply to the 
Administrative Decisions Tribunal
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